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Abstract Submission Guidelines

Abstract Submission Guidelines


Industrial Control Systems Cyber Security

Process Safety

Process safety shall be divided into three subtopics namely Functional Safety, Alarm Management and Fire Equipment Control &S afeguarding. The definition is explained in Appendix 1 below,

The intended content should be real life implementation examples, design issues solved through best engineering practices, or should be learning’s from failures/loss of control.

The engagement of various entities (governmental and non-governmental sectors) will help to disseminate the various best practices and varied experiences to the attendees.

Appendix 1.

1.1 Functional Safety

The SIS and functional safety go hand in hand, as a well-designed SIS goes a long way to achieve the functional safety needs of any industry prone to hazards, for which SIS can be a an effective control barrier.

The oil and gas industry, nuclear plants and the machinery sector, to name but a few, are all rely heavily on functional safety to achieve safety for the equipment giving rise to the hazards.

Functional safety is achieved when every specified safety function is carried out and the level of performance required of each safety function is met. This is normally achieved by a process that includes the following.

  • Assessment of the risk-reduction required by the safety function.
  • Ensuring the safety function performs to the design intent.
  • Verification that the system meets the assigned SIL, by determining the mean time between failures and the safe failure fraction (SFF), along with appropriate tests.
  • Conduct functional safety audits to examine and assess the evidence that the appropriate safety lifecycle management techniques were applied consistently and thoroughly in the relevant lifecycle stages of product.

1.2 Alarm Management

Alarm Management is aimed to maintain the number of alarms within an allowable limit so that the alarm system is optimally used to alert and protect against risks whilst not overloading plant operators. For an alarm system to be effective, every alarms presented to the operator should be a help rather than a hindrance. The objective should be to avoid the operator wasting time on deciding whether the alarm can be ignored and ensure that he does not adopt a frame of mind that this option is allowable.

The oil and gas industry, nuclear plants and the machinery sector, to name but a few, are all rely heavily on alarm management to  manage the risk of harm to people, environment and assets from the inability to maintain control during abnormal or emergency situation.

Failing to implement an effective alarm management system may expose the company to process safety incidence e.g. Esso Longford gas plant explosion, Australia, September 25, 1998.

1.3 Fired Equipment Control & Safeguarding

Many different types of fired equipment are used in oil & gas petrochemical plants namely process heaters, steam boilers and incinerators. 

The oil and gas industry, nuclear plants and the machinery sector, to name but a few, are all rely heavily on Fired Equipment Control & Safeguarding to manage the risk of harm to people operating fired equipment.

Failing to effectively implement the requirements for design, operation and maintenance of a safe operations of fired equipment, including start-ups, restart and shutdown will expose the company to process safety incidence as had happened in at the process heaters, steam boilers and incinerators around the world.

Turbomachinery Controls

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